In the Post-Cold War era, the US military has frequently conducted peace operations.
PEACE OPERATIONS IN FAILED STATES: WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE MODEL TO EMPLOY?
Today, the United strives to keep its military forces combat ready while at the time, engaging in missions that do not routinely involve combat. When it becomes necessary to send out troops into an unpredictable and potentially hostile environment, we must ensure they are trained and ready for all possible contingencies no matter how unlikely these contingencies may seem at the outset.
--Retired Army General Henry H. Shelton
The Post-Cold War era has witnessed a vast increase in the frequency of peace operations. Between 1988 and mid-2000 there were forty peace keeping missions.'
The majority of these operations have been conducted in nation-states experiencing internal conflict, collapsed governments, fragile economies, and lawlessness. Failed state is the name given to these states, because they are unable to provide law and order, economic stability, and essential social services to their people. Failed states are "the focus of the Post-Cold war peace operations." 2 In the past quarter-century, intervention from the United Nations (U.N.) on behalf of the international community has become the accepted international response to crises resulting from failed states. Historically, when responding to crises in failed states, the international community has used peace operations, carried out by peacekeeping forces, as the tool to maintain regional stability and security.
This study examines reasons for military intervention in failed states, and shows why it's essential for the military to employ the right forces to conduct peace operations. This study will suggest an appropriate peace operations model to employ in a failed state. It will describe factors in failed states that make peacekeeping operations and forces ineffective and mandate peace enforcement operations and forces for success. It will recommend peace operations include peace-building activities and peace-maintenance operations. The suggested model's utility will be then applied to two historical failed states (Somalia and East Timor) . This study argues that the appropriate intervention to employ in a failed state is a peace operations model composed of peace enforcement, peace maintenance, and peace building operations.
FAILED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
The Hart-Rodman Commission on National Security in the 2 1 st Century, in their identification of specific challenges the U.S. must be able to meet in the next 25 years, cited failed states and weak states as the future's greatest threats. Information supporting this contention comes from George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who, in February 2001, stressed that "a major concern for U.S. security to address will be the growing potential for state fragmentation and failure." 4 The U.S. and the international community have been placed in the position where they must intervene in failed states rather than ignore them: Failed states threaten regional security and peace. Nations now view failed states as being "strategically significant today and see them lying at the heart of many contemporary security challenges." 5 Michael Dziedzic points out in his article "Troubled States: How Troubling, How Manageable," that as these failed states 6 continue to disintegrate, they will generate humanitarian catastrophes. He further suggests that when "an oppressed domestic group becomes the target of systematic violence, this will inevitably spawn a mass migration in search of a safe haven, either internally"' 7 or externally into neighboring countries. He further points out that after governments have collapsed in these states, there will be no law and order. Dziedzic's major concern is that these states will end up becoming "an incubator for transnational threats for organized crime, terrorism, arms trafficking, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction." 8 The cost of imposing law and order in failed states is high, the effort is dangerous, and success is not easy to achieve. But given that the cost to the U.S. of the Balkans was $15 billion and the cost of Afghanistan so far is $40 billion, it is still "cheaper to fix a failed state than fight a war." 9
FAILED STATES
When a state can no longer provide good governance, enforce the law and protect its citizens from crime and violence, when it can no longer produce economic prosperity, educate and provide its citizens with health care, that state has failed. If the state cannot maintain its place as a member of the international community, then that state will descend "into violence, political instability, random warfare, massive human rights abuses, poverty, humanitarian disaster, and refugee crisis."1° Lack of governance and economic instability in a failed state leads to widespread crime, particularly extortion and black marketing." This lawlessness, in turn, makes it possible for terrorists to take sanctuary in these states. The international community is rightly concerned that, given the opportunity, transnational criminal networks will begin to operate and become so entrenched they will be hard to expel.1 2 The international 2 community is also rightly concerned that their political, social, and economic stability will be disrupted if neighbors in the region become failed states.' 3 In failed states, interventions by international forces may be easily viewed by the native population as invasive entry by intruders. In a failed state, the international military forces are open to encounter situations in which one native group or another will come to feel that the international force is blocking its path to power or its opportunity to destroy the enemy.1 4 That leads to attacks on humanitarian workers and the peace-keeping forces. Indigenous-force actions can range from sniping to hostage-taking , from efforts to compromise individual soldiers to intimidating military units by bomb threats, and even attacks on peace keepers' sleeping quarters or whole installations.15
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
The UN implements the will of the international community and is charged with the responsibility to maintain peace and security. The U.N. derives its authority to engage in the settlement of international disputes from the U.N. Charter.
CONSENT
According to Chapter VI of the Charter, the U.N. is charged to maintain global peace and security by-- enforcement operation is normally heavily armed. Its mission is to restore peace and establish security so NGO workers can feed the people and provide safe shelter for a displaced population. As part of its security duties the intervening force needs to be able to set up and carry out a program to collect small arms from adversarial parties. On occasion the intervening force may be asked to establish a program to train the state's new military force. Only a heavily 6 armed peace enforcement force is appropriate to engage in the duties of establishing security and restoring peace in the war-like environment of a failed state.
Intervening forces working in a failed state can be expected to confront problems of crime, poverty, disease, illiteracy, and a lack of economic prosperity and good governance. But operational planners attempting to help failing states may or may not be able to foresee the conditions where that state cannot or will not consent to U.N. intervention because of internal political chaos. Yet the international community is too aware of the risks inherent in a collapsed state to allow a failed state's sovereignty to result in non-intervention.
When planning for intervention It makes sense to plan for the worst scenario-no consent or-consent without commitment caused by political chaos in the failed state. Intervening in those circumstances means having the right forces trained, equipped, and ready to deploy, able to deliver whatever the situation calls for.
Since the use of other instruments of power will be essential. When a failed state has been made secure and law and order re-established, the political instrument of power must be applied to establish good governance.
One of the great benefits in peace maintenance operations is the planned integration of the native population of the state into the process. Peace-maintenance focuses on getting the people involved. Peace maintenance seeks community participation in establishing good governance and in working toward the reconciliation and empowerment of the people.
The success of peace operations according to Boutros Boutros-Ghali depends on "comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of well-being among people." 26 The author proposes that peacemaintenance operations, in which intervention as a political instrument of power would be undertaken, be added under the umbrella of peace operations. The author sees peace maintenance intervention as an essential element of peace operations in a failed state.
Temporary external help is critical to the process of reestablishing good internal governance in failed states.
The concept of peace maintenance originated with Jarat Chopra's book, Peace
Maintenance. Chopra sees peace maintenance operations linking the strategic and the operational levels of command and control-the actions constitute the means by which the international community, represented by the peace maintenance personnel and force, can exercise its external "political authority within a failed state." 27 Peace-maintenance operations would incorporate diplomatic, military, and humanitarian activities [and the requisite practitioners] within an overall political strategy." 28 Under the peace-maintenance model in a failed state, "the U.N. assumes exclusive responsibility for the collapsed state and serves as its governor-in-trust." 2 9 The U. N. can exercise varying degrees of authority in the state depending on the magnitude of the failure of the state. The U.N. can provide governorship, direct control, partnership or assistance in the failed state. When serving in a governorship role, the U.N. becomes responsible for carrying out the affairs of the state. When providing direct control, the U.N. controls the instruments of the state or of the administering authority. If the local authority commits an infraction, the U.N. uses its overriding authority to take corrective action. When in a partnership role, the U.N.
works as partner to the local authority, but one having a veto power and final say in decisionmaking. When providing assistance, the U.N. acts as an independent advisor, pointing out actions needed or flaws in the local system and suggesting corrections.
30
According to Jarat Chopra, a peace-maintenance operation provides the failed state a political control mechanism and builds the state's administrative network--thereby helping the failed state establish the beginning of good governance. Peace maintenance operations can continue until the state becomes a viable, self-sustaining government, capable of providing law and order and protecting its citizens.
Under a model including peace-maintenance operations, the U.N. In a governorship role would carry out "the administration of necessary and basic state services, revivification of civil society and its institution; repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; the introduction of confidence building measures that stimulate rapprochement and encourage dialogue between belligerents; the initiation of transitional processes, such as the organization and preparation of elections; the consolidation of internal and external security by training and restructuring a local police force; the drawing up of an electoral list; the administration and monitoring of the electoral process, and ensuring all faction that want to participate are represented." 3 ' Two other tasks for the U.N. to work would be "the establishment of civilian control over the police force and local military and the establishment of provincial courts. The U.N. would also "facilitate national reconciliation, establish truth commissions, empower civil society, and engage in post-conflict institutional training and reform." 32 The U.N. should identify what peace-maintenance tasks should be in the immediate-term, medium-term or long term. The purpose of tasks in the immediate-term stage is "preventive-to lower the level of intensity of the conflict and guarantee sufficiently the cessation of hostilities, so that negotiations can take place between the emerging authorities and the peacemaintenance authority. The purpose of tasks at the medium-term is once there is a period of sustained calm, then facilitate a smooth transition from international to local control of political authority. The emphasis at the long-term stage should be on a strategy that ensures the political and economic stability needed to avoid a descent back into violence." 33 
PEACE BUILDING
Peace operations need to include actions that will help rebuild a failed state's economic and social services institutions. Following the return to law and order and the beginnings of good governance, the next step in resuscitating a state is to address its problems of poverty, illiteracy, lack of economic prosperity and inadequate health care. Peace building operations are designed to help rebuild a failed state's economic, health, and educations systems. Joint Publication 1-02 defines peace building as "post conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild the governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" 34 or a regression to failure.
As Boutros Broutros-Ghali points out, "only sustained, cooperative work [with assistance from other countries] to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation." 3 5 Peace building operations help create a sustainable peace in a failed state by developing agriculture, improving transportation, providing health and education, and establishing a system to promote economic prosperity. Peace building operations are the tool to help rebuild the economic, health, and education systems in a failed state.
The U.N. intervention forces and teams can begin peace building activities during the U.N.'s period of governorship. The operations would include building the "basic infrastructureroads, bridges, health and education services, water and sanitation systems, irrigation systems, commercial outlets and telecommunication systems." 36 The U.N. advisors, NGO workers and others would look to the international community for economic aid. Efforts would be taken to coordinate economic packages and arrange for technical assistance. The goal would be to promote economic progress, revitalize social services, and implement environmental protection plans.
HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES
History provides us with lessons that can help us prepare for and reckon with the future.
Somalia and East Timor are failed states. Their governments are unable to govern, to enforce the laws, to protect their citizens, to produce economic prosperity, or to provide education and health care. These states failed when conditions deteriorated to such a grave state that they gave rise to humanitarian and refugee crises. The decision of the international community, in each case, was to intervene by conducting peace operations. The economy in Somalia was a shambles. As result of drought, civil war and criminal activity, Somalia became incapable of producing food and feeding its people. This eventually created a famine throughout the country, which in turn, created a humanitarian disaster and refugee crisis. The international community became seriously concerned about the massive loss of life and the refugee flow into neighboring countries.. Somalia's condition was starting to have an impact on regional peace and stability. According to the U.N., the conditions continued to deteriorate until --
[b]y 1992, almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number in the country, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related diseases. The magnitude of suffering was immense. Overall, an estimated 300,000 people, including many children, died. Some 2 million people, violently displaced from their home areas, fled either to neighboring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. All institutions of governance and at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure disintegrated. 4 3 Alleviating the starvation in the country was a major mission for the international aid workers. The U.N. and NGO workers in country attempted to operate their food distribution facilities, but operating in the unsafe, dangerous environment without security became impossible. The U.N. eventually moved its function to Nairobi, Kenya, and started flying in food to airports in Somalia for distribution. The NGO workers decided to stay in Somalia. Neither was successful in their efforts to curb starvation because looting, stealing and extortion from the gangs and clan warlords constantly interrupted their food distribution. 44 The U.N. thought that the civil war had caused the interruption of food distribution. They necessary, it also authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force. With the observers in place to monitor, the U.N. was hopeful that a cease-fire would stop the looting. Unfortunately, the ceasefire did very little to prevent looting, causing the relief workers throughout the country to be unable to function. 45 The U.N. eventually decided to deploy a peacekeeping force as the answer to safeguarding the relief workers from looting and banditry.
The U.N. sent in a lightly armed force of 500 Pakistani peacekeepers. The peacekeeping force was given the mission of securing the port, safeguarding food shipments, and escorting food convoys to the distribution stations. They were prohibited from returning fire except in selfdefense. Even with a peacekeeping force in place, the armed gangs were still stealing the food.
Unable to stop the banditry and looting, the peacekeepers were ineffective in their ability to 46 protect the relief workers.
As result, the famine and people dying at record numbers continued. UNOSOM I was deemed an unsuccessful mission because without food and medical supplies,. Somalia remained a humanitarian and refugee catastrophe.
The chances of UNOSOM I's peace keeping force accomplishing its humanitarian mission with any degree of success were slim from the beginning for several reasons. First, given that the U.N. thought that the civil war was what was making the country dangerous and unsafe for the relief workers to function, the U.N.'s obtaining a cease-fire agreement to terminate the fighting between Aideed and Ali was a right decision. But the U.N. assumed that once the cease-fire was in effect, it would make traveling around the country less dangerous for the relief workers. It did not. The relief workers still experienced banditry and looting despite the ceasefire, and banditry and looting continued even with peacekeepers in place. The U.N. did not initially understand that a country lacking a political authority to administer good governance would eventually become a lawless society. Only when the food was still not reaching those in need did the U.N. begin to understand that the hijacking of vehicles and the looting of convoys and warehouses stemmed from the absence of a government capable of maintaining law and order. 4 7 Second, the U.N. unknowingly sent a lightly armed peacekeeping force to accomplish what for them would be a virtually impossible mission. The peacekeepers were not equipped to fight gangsters. As a result, the peacekeepers were unable to accomplish their mission. The U.N. had underestimated the capabilities of the criminal element. The gangsters were heavily armed; they controlled their environment, and they profited from black marketing stolen food.
The food was a matter of survival for gangsters, and they were not going to allow outsides to stop them. The gangsters outgunned and out manned the peacekeepers, and they were ready to fight. When the food distribution came to a halt, the U.N. realized that they needed to send in a bigger force.
Finally, Somalia's consent for sending in a peacekeeping force was shaky from the start. Several terrorist groups currently have found homes in a number of these states. In forums held by the international community seeking consensus on ways to address the problem of failed states, members of the international community, particularly the U.S., have come to realize that fixing failed states requires more than just providing foreign aid. Fixing failed states may require several years of involvement and participation. Helping a failed state until it can sustain itself politically and economically may mean staying committed and engaged even under adversity.
The international community must be willing to consider many approaches to help reduce problems in failed states.
The U.S. and the international community, know that to be successful in restoring stability in a failed state, the U.N. must be able to work on the root causes of the problem or they risk having to do the job a second time. The peace operations model is the only model at this time able to control conditions in a failed state well enough to allow root causes to be ameliorated, is one that encompasses three carefully phased, manned, and equipped specific operations:
peace enforcement, peace-maintenance, and peace building operations.
Peace operations in Somalia and East Timor have shown us that it is essential to intervene with the right kind of forces to conduct the mission. Conducting initial interventions in Somalia with a peacekeeping operation jeopardized the mission. The U.N.'s peacekeeping force was the wrong level of military force for employment in Somalia. Such a force is not manned nor equipped to face the lawless, combat-type environment inevitable in a failed state.
The lightly-armed military was not able to protect themselves nor others when faced with a heavily-armed group of warlords. Having only a peacekeeping force at hand, the U.N. lacked firepower not only to defend against attacks from belligerents, but also to carry out the broader aspects of their security mission. The NGOs were unable to provide food and medical assistance and, as a result, the famine and refugee flow persisted--seriously threatening regional peace and stability. Furthermore, because the peacekeepers could not maintain peace and security in the lawless environment, the U.N. in Somalia was unable to implement plans for establishing good governance or peace building.
Obversely, when the U.N. first intervened in East Timor, the UN's mandate was limited to performing peace operations In East Timor-but that changed with the militia's continued destruction of the country. When the U.N. saw their peacekeeping force was inadequately 20 prepared to address the conditions as they were found, the Security Council quickly revised their plans. The second U.N. military force was ready to face combat-type conditions.
Conducting initial interventions as peace enforcement operations with a heavily armed force fosters success in addressing the characteristic war-like environment. 63 Moving from a peacekeeping force to a peace enforcement force in East Timor ensured intervention by a military force ready to face combat-type conditions. When law and order was restored and peace was enforced, conditions for peace building and good governance were established. The U.N. and the NGOs were able to establish political authority and to begin rebuilding the nation. The follow-on UNATET mission was then able to help establish good governance and assist in the development of civil social services. All this was made possible by the U.N.'s decision to send in peace-enforcement forces manned and equipped to establish law and order out of the chaos of a failed state.
The challenges in failed states will mandate the 2 1 st Century use of a peace operations model that includes peace enforcement, peace maintenance, and peace building. Peace operations in failed states can only be successfully carried out using a multilateral approach. 
